管科系系列讲座第251-252期预告

管科系系列讲座第251期预告

时　　间：2019年11月8日（周五）13:30

地　　点：思源楼524

主  持 人：冯天俊教授（商务分析与运营创新研究中心）

主讲嘉宾： Dr. Hubert Pun is a professor and the Ph.D. program coordinator of the Management Science area group at the Ivey Business School (Western University).

主　　题： Blockchain Adoption for Combating Deceptive Counterfeits

摘　　要： In this paper, we study combating deceptive counterfeiting using blockchain technology. When a product is tagged with a non-duplicable unique identifier customers know whether a product is authentic or fake. However, customers have privacy concerns while using blockchain. We consider a market with a manufacturer and a deceptive counterfeiter. The manufacturer can either use blockchain or signal through pricing to validate product authenticity. The government can incentivize blockchain adoption by providing subsidy to the manufacturer while optimizing social welfare.  We find that without government subsidy, blockchain should be used only when the counterfeit quality is intermediate or when customers have intermediate distrust about products in the market. When customers have serious distrust about products, differential pricing strategy is more effective than blockchain. With subsidy, however, we show that differential pricing strategy should never be used. Blockchain can be more effective than differential pricing strategy in eliminating post-purchase regret, and our result advocates that government should participate in the manufacturer’s blockchain adoption decision because this benefits customers and society. 

管科系系列讲座第252期预告

时　　间：2019年11月15日（周五）13:30

地　　点：思源楼524

主  持 人：田林副教授（大智慧实验室）

主讲嘉宾： Yi Zhu is an Associate Professor of Marketing, Mary & Jim Lawrence Fellow at the University of Minnesota.

主　　题： Does Surge Pricing Affect Customer Complaint Rates?

摘　　要： Many two-sided matching platforms, such as those for lodging, labor, and ridesharing, use a review system to monitor service providers, where dissatisfied customers can complain about their service experience. Using comprehensive datasets from a large ridesharing platform, this paper explores whether service providers (drivers) systematically receive complaints for reasons that are not their fault. We find that surge pricing, a factor that is not the driver's fault, increases the likelihood of complaints by a factor of 1.12 to 1.33, on average. This effect is amplified for novice drivers and during rush hours. We use two additional approaches to provide causal support for the finding: a regression discontinuity exploiting a policy change that sets caps on surge pricing, and a matching estimator exploiting discontinuity in surge triggering. To extend the endpoint of our analysis to the economic impact, we estimate how the complaints affect a driver's daily income. We calculate that 25% of a driver's immediate income gain from surge fares is offset by the future income loss due to the increased complaint rate. These results suggest platforms should account for non-service-provider-responsible factors when monitoring and evaluating customer reviews to improve service experiences.

管理科学系

2019-10-29